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THE DEMISE OF THE RIGHT-PRIVILEGE 
DISTINCTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
William W. Van Alstyne * 
The riglzt-privilege distinction, as it appeared in an early state-
ment by Justice H ohnes, has long hampered individuals within the 
public sector in protecting themselves against arbitrary govern-
mental actio1t. In tlzis article Professor Van Alstyne reviews the uses 
mzd misuses to which tlze "privilege" concept lzas bee1t put and then 
examines those doctrines whose flanking attacks have gradually 
eroded its efficacy. But none of these doctrines comes to grips 
with Holmes' basic idea of a "privilege" to which substantive due 
process is inapplicable. Applying Holmes' own jurisprudence, the 
aut/tor argues that the concept of "privilege" is today no longer 
viable, and tlzat the size and power of the governmental role in the 
public sector requires substantive due process control of the state 
in all its capacities. 
I N 1892, Justice Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts Su-preme Judicial Court in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 
trenchantly dispatched the petition of a policeman who had been 
fired for violating a regulation which restricted his political ac-
tivities: 1 
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but 
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. 
With customary bluntness Holmes went on to observe: 2 
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not 
agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as 
of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant can-
not complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are 
offered him. 
A scant three years later, Justice Holmes had occasion to con-
firm this conception of the scope of constitutional protection in 
upholding the conviction of a preacher who had violated a mu-
nicipal ordinance in presenting a public address on the Boston 
Common without securing a permit from the mayor. Noting 
that the Boston Common was gover11-mentally owned, and dis-
*Professor of Law, Duke Law School. A.B., University of Southern California, 
I9SS; LL.B., Stanford, I9S8. 
1 ISS Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). 
2 I d. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. 
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regarding the fact that the ordinance was utterly lacking in 
standards to control the mayor's discretion, Holmes added: 8 
For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public 
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement 
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a 
private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right 
interferes, the Legislature may end the right of the public to 
enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to 
public uses. So it may take the lesser step of limiting the public 
use to certain purposes. 
Thus, it was as though Justice Holmes merely restated his earlier 
epigram: the defendant may have a constitutional right to talk 
religion, but he has no constitutional right to use the Boston 
Common. 
This tough-minded distinction between constitutionally pro-
tected rights of private citizens and unprotected governmental 
privileges has been applied to defeat a great variety of claims 
associated with government employment or other forms of largess. 
In upholding the summary dismissal of a federal civil servant 
from a nonsensitive position on grounds of suspected disloyalty, 
for instance, a federal court of appeals has said: 4 "The First 
Amendment guarantees free speech and assembly, but it does not 
guarantee Government employ." Similarly, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court abruptly rejected fourteenth amendment claims by 
a public school teacher punished for violating a statutory ban 
on the teaching of "any theory that denies the story of the divine 
creation": 5 
[Petitioner] had no right or privilege to serve the State except 
3 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 5II, 39 N.E. II3, II3 (1895), aff'd, 
167 U.S. 43 (1897 ). But see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Hague v. CIO, 
307 u.s. 496 (1939). 
4 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 195o), aff'd by an equally 
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). Compare Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 
U.S. 886 (1961) (summary dismissal of civilian cook on military installation up-
held), with Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97, so6-o8 (1959) (revocation 
of security clearance of civilian aeronautical engineer without safeguards of con-
frontation and cross-examination held invalid in absence of explicit presidential 
or congressional authorization for agency procedures), and Willner v. Committee 
on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (state cannot deny admission to bar without 
meeting requirements of procedural due process). See also United Pub. Workers 
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (Hatch Act upheld; e.·ttent of constitutional guar-
antees must be balanced against need for efficient civil service). 
5 Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. zos, 109-IO, III-I2, 289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927). 
But see Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) (loyalty oath for state university 
void for overbreadth), and cases cited therein. 
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upon such terms as the State prescribed. . . . In dealing with its 
own employees engaged upon its own work, the State is not ham-
pered by the limitations of ... the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. 
And more recently, in 1954, the Supreme Court upheld the sus-
pension of a physician's license on equally tenuous grounds. 
The physician had been convicted of contempt of Congress for 
declining to produce certain papers for a committee of the House 
of Representatives. His license was suspended on the basis of 
this criminal conviction, even without a showing that his actions 
related to his competence or professional integrity as a physi-
cian: 6 
The practice of medicine in New York is lawfully prohibited by 
the State except upon the conditions it imposes. Such practice is 
a privilege granted by the State under its substantially plenary 
power to fix the terms of admission. 
If this view were uniformly applied, the devastating effect it 
would have on any constitutional claims within the public sector 
can be readily perceived.7 A public housing tenant summarily 
evicted without a hearing or any stated reason should have no 
basis for complaint: surely one no more has a right to public 
housing than to public employment; in either case he simply 
takes the benefit on the terms offered him.8 An impoverished 
couple actually domiciled in a state should still have no complaint 
against a one-year residence requirement for welfare recipients: 
one may have a right to equal protection, but he has no right to 
public welfare.0 And certainly public university students sum-
6 Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954). 
7 Shepardizing McAuliffe yielded more than 70 cases, 77% of which resolved the 
decision against the constitutional claim being asserted. See, e.g., Hirschman v. 
Los Angeles County, 231 P.2d 140 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951), aff'd, 39 Cal. 2d 6g8, 
249 P.2d 287 (1952) (county employees dismissed for refusal to sign loyalty oath); 
Hornstein v. Dlinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 412 Dl. 365, 106 N.E.2d 354 (1952) 
(summary revocation of liquor license without prior notice or hearing) ; Wilkie 
v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1941) (welfare pension cut off 
after recipient's insistence on "right to sleep under an old barn, in a nest of rags") ; 
CIO v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1946) (injunction against 
no-union rule for city employees denied) ; Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 
2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963) (married high school student barred from extra-
curricular activities). 
8 See Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (per curiam), 
vacated per curiam, 386 U.S. 670 (1967). 
9 But see Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967); Thompson v. 
Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3286 
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marily expelled or suspended should have no constitutional 
grounds for reinstatement, for it must be equally clear that while 
petitioners may have a right to procedural due process, they have 
no right to be educated at public expense.10 
Fortunately, however, the right-privilege distinction has not 
in fact removed all restraints from the government in the public 
sector. Although in some cases it has been misapplied to facts 
which did not come within its rationale at all, in others it has 
not been applied even though the facts did fit its rationale. In-
creasingly, when the petitioner's primary interest in the public 
sector could not be characterized as a "right" entitled to pro-
tection on grounds of substantive due process, courts have none-
theless found some other implicated right to sustain the claim. 
Alternatively, they have granted relief through recourse to con-
stitutional provisions which operate irrespective of whether what 
is involved is deemed a privilege, rather than a right. While 
the concept of "privilege" underlying Holmes' epigram remains 
nominally intact, its implications for positive law have been grad-
ually eroded. After considering those situations where the right-
privilege distinction has been misapplied, I propose to review 
those means which the Supreme Court has utilized to avoid the 
harsh consequences of the distinction, and then to reexamine the 
essential soundness of the distinction itself. 
I. AN EPIGRAM OVERDONE 
The notion that "the petitioner has no right to be a police-
man" is a specific application of the larger view that no one has 
a constitutional right to government largess.U This view dis-
tinguishes the limited power of the state "reasonably" to regulate 
activities conducted by private means without substantial assist-
ance by government from the unlimited power of the state to 
regulate advantages supplied by government without obligation. 
The conception of unprotected state-bestowed privileges was not 
(U.S. Jan. 15, 1968) (No. 813); Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. 
Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967). 
1° Compare Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934) 
(requirement to take military science course as condition of enrollment upheld) 1 
with Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. detzied, 
368 U.S. 930 (rg6r) (procedural due process required for expulsion of students in 
good standing at tax-supported college). 
11 The phrase "government largess" is used to describe tbe origin of a status de-
pendent upon government expenditures solely in deference to tbe conventional view 
tbat such expenditures are initiated without constitutional obligation. 
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originally designed to curtail claims of substantive due process 
in the private sector.12 An individual could still directly assail 
a state statute affecting his private employment on the ground 
that it unreasonably regulated his right to work or right to con-
tract, without having to show it also indirectly curtailed some 
separately named constitutional interest such as his freedom of 
speech. As the Court suggested in Meyer v. Nebraska, in invali-
dating a state statute forbidding teachers from providing in-
struction in German even in private schools: 13 
The established doctrine is that this liberty [guaranteed by the 
due process clause] may not be interfered with, under the guise of 
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbi-
trary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the 
competency of the State to effect. Determination by the legisla-
ture of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not 
final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts. 
If the basic distinction implied by Holmes in McAuliffe is 
kept in mind, cases of the same general period, such as Hamilton 
v. Regents of the University of California 14 are not inconsistent 
with Meyer. In Hamilton, as in McAuliffe, petitioners were com-
plaining of regulations attached to something they sought from 
the state rather than something they had secured in the private 
sector without public assistance. Students excluded from the 
state university for failing to take military training were there-
fore unable to argue on the basis of substantive due process that 
they had a "right to acquire useful instruction," since the instruc-
tion they sought was dependent on government largess.15 How-
12 The sources of substantive due process antecedent to the Constitution are well 
described in E. CoRWIN, THE "HIGHER LAw" BAcKGROUND OF AMERICAN CoN-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1955). For subsequent developments see J. JAMEs, THE FRAM-
ING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956) j J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 
(1965); Graham, Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 
I8Jo-I86o, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 483 (1952); Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process 
of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, I8 CALIF. L. REv. 
583 (!930). 
13 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (invalidating compulsory public school attendance); Truax v. Raich, 239 
U.S. 33 (1915) (invalidating state limitation on employment of aliens). See- also 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
14 293 u.s. 245 (!934). 
15 The only argument available to petitioners in Hamilton was based on the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, discussed at pp. 1445-49 infra. In this 
regard they argued (unsuccessfully) that the ROTC requirement operated as an 
unconstitutional condition upon their freedom of religion to the extent that they 
had a conscientious ob~ection to military training. 
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ever, other cases relying upon the McAuliffe view blurred the 
distinction upon which it was based. In Barsky v. Board of Re-
gents/6 for instance, the physician whose license was suspended 
following his conviction of contempt of Congress was not merely 
dropped from a public job. Not even on the public payroll to 
begin with, he was forbidden under pain of criminal prosecution 
to practice medicine privately. What had happened was that, 
over a period of time, the Court had recognized that even the 
personal liberty to contract in the private sector, to work in the 
private sector, or to own property was subject to a high degree 
of reasonable governmental regulation in the public interest 
against the claim that such "rights" were absolutely protected 
by the fourteenth amendment. This recognition emerged in an 
irregular line of thoughtful cases beginning no later than Munn 
v. Illinois 17 and tracing through Holden v. Hardy 18 and Muller 
v. Oregon.19 It was made firm through Nebbia v. New York 20 
and has been consistently followed to the present time.21 In 
recognizing that the "right" to own property or the "right" to 
work in the private sector is necessarily subject to public regu-
lation compatible with some minimum standard of substantive 
due process, however, the Court had never asserted that such 
an interest was wholly outside the protection of the due process 
clause. But cases such as Barsky tacitly moved toward the prop-
osition that because the private sector is subject to considerable 
public regulation, even the exercise of a prerogative in the private 
sector is merely a privilege, and can stand on no better footing 
than other kinds of privileges - such as those in the public sec-
tor.22 Thus the Court moved by negligent degrees in a few aber-
rant cases to the following neologism: the petitioner may have 
a right to talk politics, but he has no right to be a doctor -
16 347 U.S. 442 (1954). 
17 94 U.S. II3 (1877). 
18 x69 U.S. 366 (x898). 
19 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
20 29I U.S. 502 (1934). 
21 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See generally Jacobson, 
Federalism and Property Rights, xs N.Y.UL.Q. REv. 319 (1938); McCloskey, 
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation a11d Reburial, 
1962 SUP. CT. REv. 34; Rodes, Due Process and Social Legislation i11 the Supreme 
Court-A Post Mortem, 33 NoTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1957). 
22 See, e.g., Hornstein v. Dlinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 4I2 m. 365, I06 
N.E.2d 354 (1952) (revocation of liquor license); Morley v. Police Comm'r, 26x 
Mass. 269, 276-77, I59 N.E. 41, 43 (1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 625 (1928) 
(suspension or revocation of hackney license); cf. W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL 
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS I05-5I (1956). 
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even a private one. The excerpt from Barsky is so instructive on 
this point as to bear repeating: 23 
The practice of medicin~ in New York is lawfully prohibited by 
the State except upon the conditions it imposes. Such practice is a 
privilege granted by the State under its substantially plenary 
power to fix the terms of admission. 
II. ERODING THE EPIGRAM 
Nearly a half dozen means are currently available to circum-
vent the harsh consequences of the right-privilege distinction as 
applied to private interests in the public sector. Each peacefully 
coexists with the Holmes epigram, for none involves any direct 
repudiation of the right-privilege distinction as a limitation on 
claims of substantive due process in the public sector. But the 
extent to which these devices are available depends upon the cir-
cumstances, and all but one have substantial practical limitations. 
A. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 24 takes for granted 
that "the petitioner has no right to be a policeman," but it em-
phasizes the right he is conceded to possess by reason of an explicit 
provision in the first amendment, his "right to talk politics." As 
stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland in 1926: 25 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state 
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the 
citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to 
uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the 
guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege 
which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. . . . If the state 
may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condi-
tion of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. 
It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution 
of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence. 
Essentially, this doctrine declares that whatever an express con-
23 347 U.S. at 45r. 
24 The doctrine has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Hale, Unconstitutional 
Conditiotts aud Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 32r (r935); O'Neil, 
Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. 
L. REv. 443, 463-66 (rg66); Note, Uncoustitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. 
REv. r595, r596 (rg6o). 
25 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 27r U.S. 583, 593--94 
(rg26). 
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stitutional provision forbids government to do directly it equally 
forbids government to do indirectly. As a consequence, it seems 
to follow that the first amendment forbids the government to con-
dition its largess upon the willingness of the petitioner to sur-
render a right which he would otherwise be entitled to exercise 
as a private citizen. The net effect is to enable an individual to 
challenge certain conditions imposed upon his public employment 
without disturbing the presupposition that he has no "right" to 
that employment. 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been applied, for 
example, to forbid a state to discontinue unemployment benefits 
to a person refusing Saturday employment for religious reasons.20 
And it has been employed to protect the status of state college 
students from summary termination, against the argument that 
the privilege of attendance had been conditioned upon their ac-
ceptance of a rule permitting summary dismissaP7 The doc-
trine would appear to apply equally well to every other case where 
the enjoyment of a government-connected interest is conditioned 
upon a rule requiring that one abstain from the exercise of some 
right protected by an express clause in the Constitution. Literal 
application of the doctrine might mean, for instance, that a wel-
fare recipient need not consent (and cannot be held by his eco-
nomically coerced consent) to a warrantless search of his 
lodgings absent circumstances otherwise justifying an equivalent 
administrative search of private premises occupied by one not 
on welfare.28 It would also suggest that a policeman can no more 
be made to waive his privilege against self-incrimination than 
26 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963): "It is too late in the day to 
doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial 
of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." 
27 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d rso, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) ("the State cannot condition the granting of even a 
privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due 
process"). For other applications see, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 5I9-
20 (1958) (special veterans' exemption from state tax cannot be conditioned on a 
loyalty oath); Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1949) 
(CAB cannot condition a flying permit on consent to discretionary summary rev-
ocation); Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 275, 70 N.W.2d 6o5, 
6o8-o9, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955) (tenant in public housing may challenge 
regulation requiring certification of nonmembership in certain "subversive" or-
ganizations as conditions of continued occupancy). 
28 Compare Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (welfare payments cannot be conditioned on consent to submit to 
warrantless searches), with Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (r967) (housing 
code regulation which . provided for warrantless administrative searches struck 
down). 
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can a private attorney.29 It would further imply that the decision 
in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,S0 upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Hatch Act, was incorrect, since the political ac-
tivity pursued by the civil servant in that case was doubtless pro-
tected by the first amendment from direct regulation as applied 
to private citizens.31 As an "exception" to the right-privilege dis-
tinction, the doctrine seems to be a very broad one which is sub-
ject only to one major limitation: the petitioner must demonstrate 
that the condition of which he complains is unreasonable in the 
special sense that it prohibits or abridges the exercise of a right 
protected by an explicit provision in the Constitution.32 It pro-
vides no protection against a regulation which is simply unreason-
able or even outrageous in that it has no reasonable connection 
with any legitimate public purpose, for in that case only the 
petitioner's public status is menaced- something to which he 
presumably has no "right" to begin with.33 . 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is highly attractive 
for two quite practical reasons. First, it preserves the appearance 
of judicial objectivity. A court need not "weigh" or "balance"; 
it need simply apply the literal mandate of a given constitutional 
provision flatly to forbid government from conditioning its largess 
on any waiver of such a provision regardless of the circumstances. 
A court may thus avoid any unseemly appearance of acting as a 
superlegislature. Second, the doctrine greatly expedites decision 
making and provides clear guidelines in cases which might other-
wise be especially difficult to resolve. Instead of canvassing a host 
of variables in a quasi-legislative fashion on the strength of a 
29 Compare Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), with Spevack v. 
Klein, 385 U.S. 5II (1967). 
30 330 u.s. 75 (1947). 
31 But see pp. 1448-49 infra. 
32 There are all sorts of difficulties in trying to make sense of such a distinc-
tion, for reasonable persons may surely disagree as to which provisions are "ex-
plicit." But see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). One might also wonder why the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions should be confined to rights which are more or less explicitly described, 
and why it does not extend equally to rights worked out by implication from 
more general provisions such as the ninth amendment and the (substantive) due 
process clauses of the :fifth and fourteenth amendments. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the doctrine has seldom been applied other than to explicit rights, notably 
freedom of speech. 
33 See, e.g., Carraway v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 251 F. Supp. 462, 465 
(E.D. La. 1966). For a better and more qualified expression of this view, see Linde, 
Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Wel-
fare State, 40 WAsH. L. REv. 10, 76 (1965). 
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barely adequate record, a court may seem to have but a single 
straightforward question to resolve: did the regulation in question 
condition the petitioner's privilege upon the waiver of a named 
constitutional right? 34 
Mr. Justice Holmes, however, consistently with his earlier hold-
ing in McAuliffe, never fully accepted the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine and was probably correct in believing that in its 
absolute form it evaded the more difficult question raised by jus-
tifiable state regulations.35 The basic flaw in the doctrine is its 
assumption that the same evil results from attaching certain con-
ditions to government-connected activity as from imposing such 
conditions on persons not connected with government. In many 
cases this may be true, but the connection with the government 
may in certain circumstances make otherwise unreasonable con-
ditions quite reasonable. In Holmes' view, even rights protected 
by an express provision of the Constitution were relative and 
might be made to yield to certain necessities. To forbid the 
false shouting of "Fire I" in the crowded theater was not to reach 
the "same result" as to forbid shouting in one's bedroom.86 To 
limit a policeman's privilege against self-incrimination in con-
nection with questions immediately related to his job as a police-
man, and solely in order to determine whether there is just cause 
to discharge him or at least to make further inquiry, would not 
be the "same thing" as to require answers of citizens in police 
custody for the purpose of aiding their criminal prosecution. The 
judicial result cannot be made to turn upon such a pretended 
"sameness." Thus to hold that the privilege against self-incrim-
ination applies to public employees should not prevent the gov-
ernment, under appropriate circumstances, from making inquiry 
of an employee respecting his job.87 And, under the facts of 
McAuliffe, the existence of a right to talk politics ought not 
34 Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and Davis 
v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 739-40 (1966). But see note 32 supra. 
35 See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 
6oo-o2 (1926) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
36 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
37 Cf. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 
(1921) (Holmes, J.): 
[T]he word "right" is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to 
slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the 
conclusion. Most rights are qualified. A man has at least as absolute a right to 
give his own money as he has to demand money from a party that has made 
no promise to him; yet if he gives it to induce another to steal or murder 
the purpose of the act makes it a crime. 
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necessarily to mean that it can be exercised in violation of a de-
partmental regulation while one is in government service, at least 
if the character of the governmental position necessitates the 
restriction of this right in the interest of a compelling public 
good.38 Yet the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, while attach-
ing no constitutional significance to the status in the public sec-
tor, may lack the flexibility adequately to treat such problems. 
B. "Indirect Effects" and Constitutional Rights 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has· usually been 
applied only to regulations which directly forbid the enjoyment 
of an explicit constitutional right. The doctrine has been of 
little assistance in those situations, however, where the regula-
tion of status in the public sector has had only an indirect effect 
on such a right, without directly and wholly forbidding its ex-
ercise. The Supreme Court has nonetheless occasionally pro-
tected the petitioner's status under such circumstances by em-
phasizing the "unconstitutional effect" of the regulation, although 
still leaving undisturbed the conventional view that one has no 
constitutional right per se to status in the public sector. The 
character of constitutional review is more complex in such cases 
than in those typically believed to involve unconstitutional condi-
tions, however; and it correspondingly begs fewer questions. 
The Court attempts to balance competing public and private con-
cerns to determine whether the regulation as applied has a suffi-
cient connection with important enough state interests to out-
weigh the incidental effect on the constitutional rights of the 
affected class. 
An excellent illustration of such an approach is provided by 
Shelton v. Tucker.39 A closely divided Court invalidated an Ar-
kansas statute requiring every public school teacher annually 
to file an affidavit listing every organization to which he belonged 
or to which he had regularly contributed within the preceding 
five years. The statute itself did not penalize membership in 
any group.40 Thus, the claim did not lend itself to quick judicial 
38 B11t see United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). In fact, 
Holmes seems to have gone even further than this and to have felt that the "reason-
ableness" of a regulation could be somewhat more liberally construed when a 
privilege rather than a right was involved. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. 
Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 602 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
39 364 U.S. 479 (xg6o). 
40 Nor did the statute provide that disclosure of membership would have to be 
furnished whether or not a given teacher felt that such a disclosure would tend 
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dispatch through a mechanical holding that freedom of associa-
tion is protected by the first amendment and that the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions forbids a state to condition its 
favor upon the surrender of a constitutional right. Had the Court 
wanted to apply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, it 
would first have had to hold that the first amendment broadly 
guarantees, in addition to the freedom to speak, an absolute right 
of nondisclosure respecting one's political views and associa-
tions. It might then have held that the Arkansas statute operated 
as an unconstitutional condition against that right. Such an ex-
pansive right is not readily apparent on the face of the amend-
ment, however, and a formulation broad enough for the case at 
hand would have had serious implications in related areas. It 
might, for example, have raised serious doubts as to the validity 
of the present limitations on the prerogative of a witness before 
a congressional investigating committee to decline to answer any 
relevant and substantially non-incriminating questions.41 The 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, mechanically applied, 
might not furnish room to make distinctions as to the reasonable-
ness of the demand for information under all the circumstances. 
In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court eschewed the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine and instead undertook a more difficult and 
painstaking inquiry. It guessed the probable effect of the statute 
in discouraging controversial political association, in light of the 
lack of a tenure system t6 provide job security. It acknowledged 
the state's legitimate but uncompelling interest in avoiding pos-
sible confliCts of interest and time-consuming commitments on 
the part of its employees. It also noted that less ominous means 
were open to the state to protect its interests than the compilation 
of unconfidential and indiscriminately inclusive membership lists. 
A majority of five finally concluded that the statute was invalid 
in view of its chilling effect on the exercise of the first amend-
ment freedoms of association and speech.42 
The form of analysis used by the Court in Shelton reflects a 
to incriminate him. Thus no fifth amendment issue was presented. Compare 
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. I (xg6x), witls 
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Contxol Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (xg65). 
41 The Court has typically eschewed a "right of silence" approach in this area 
in favor of a balancing of the indirect effects of the inquiry against the alleged 
need for and relevance of the information. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963), and cases cited therein. 
42 For a critical review of the case, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANCEI(OUS 
BRANCH 51-55, 203-o4 (xg62). 
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more fundamental difference between the unconstitutional con-
ditions and indirect effects doctrines than can be accounted for 
by the mere presence or absence of a direct ban on the exercise 
of a constitutional right. Presumably the Court could have 
limited its inquiry to whether the Arkansas statute might indi-
rectly produce the same result in its infringement of freedom of 
association as would a direct prohibition on membership in cer-
tain groups. It could thus have avoided the speculative weigh-
ing of offsetting private and public interests, for any such regu-
lation which would have the effect of infringing first amend-
ment guarantees could be struck down as an unconstitutional 
condition on public employment. But the weakness of the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine was that in its very ease of appli-
cation it failed to attach any significance to the legitimate public 
purposes which any regulation might serve. In contrast, Shelton 
v. Tucker quite carefully focuses on the competing interests in-
volved. It would presumably have been decided differently if 
the state had been able to show (a) a stronger public interest, 
(b) a closer connection between the information requested and 
the protection of important public interests, or (c) the lack of 
any feasible alternative means adequately to guard against em-
ployee conflicts of interest. The result might have been different, 
that is, even though the degree of indirect effect on freedom of 
association would have remained constant.43 Thus, the indirect 
involvement of a specific constitutional interest does not, as under 
the mechanical application of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, necessarily or as readily guarantee the invalidity of 
the regulation. 
However, even the indirect effects group of cases fails to im-
pair the conventional view that status in the public sector does 
not itself present a constitutionally protected interest. The pe-
titioners in Shelton were not able to claim that the Arkansas 
statute was a constitutionally unreasonable regulation of their 
employment; the condition on their public status again was vul-
nerable only because it was a constitutionally unreasonable regu-
lation of their first amendment freedom of association. 
C. Procedural Due Process 
Although there are only a few cases in which a procedural 
argument is clearly featured, a person may sometimes success-
43 Cf., e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 
r, 88-ros (rg6r). 
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fully rely on an independent right to procedural due process to 
avoid some of the harsh consequences of the right-privilege dis-
tinction. Again, however, this argument outwardly does not 
reject the major premise of that distinction. In the first instance, 
a requirement of a minimally fair hearing holds only that when-
ever the legislature has seen fit to limit the grounds for termi-
nating or denying certain benefits, the administering agency must 
still observe certain minimum procedural standards to provide 
reasonable assurance that the petitioner did in fact offend one 
of the specified grounds; but the power of Congress or a state 
legislature to set substantive standards without constitutional 
restriction is not denied. Thus, the petitioner may have no right 
to talk politics while in the public service, but still he may not 
be discharged without an adequate hearing which may fairly de-
termine whether in fact he had been talking politics. As Mr. 
Justice Jackson put it: 44 
The fact that one may not have a legal right to get or keep a 
government post does not mean that he can be adjudged ineligible 
illegally. 
Accordingly, the constitutional right to procedural due process 
can be made to operate independently of whether the petitioner 
has a "right" to talk politics or a "right" to be a policeman. It 
comes in from the outside to build in the assurance provided by 
fair procedures that a decision is in fact supportable on what-
ever grounds the legislature or an agency itself has provided. 
The character of the hearing to which a person may be con-
stitutionally entitled may depend upon the importance of what 
he stands to lose, of course, but his constitutional right to proce-
dural due process entitles him to a quality of hearing at least 
minimally proportioned to the gravity of what he otherwise stands 
to lose through administrative fiat. 
The need for procedural due process may also be derived from 
44 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1961) 
(concurxing opinion); see Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 
196r): 
One may not have a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the Govern-
ment may not prohibit one from going there unless by means consonant 
with [procedural] due process of law. 
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 195r), aff'd, 344 
U.S, 561 (1953): 
[Appellant] is entitled to have procedural due process observed in the pro-
tection of these substantive rights even though substantive due process would 
not compel the rights to be given. 
See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
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the concept of unconstitutional conditions. If the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine is sound in holding that government 
may not terminate or withhold benefits according to standards 
it is constitutionally forbidden to impose upon private citizens, 
then it would seem to follow that a person whose status in the 
public sector is threatened by administrative action should have 
a right to a fair hearing to make certain that the administrative 
action is not in fact being taken for reasons which are constitu-
tionally improper. Otherwise, the doctrine could be effectively 
undermined by wholly insulating unconstitutional administrative 
action from discovery and correction. The problem in Thorpe 
v. Housing Authority 45 may illustrate this point. Mrs. Thorpe 
occupied a public housing unit under an agreement providing for 
unilateral termination by the Authority on fifteen days' notice 
without a hearing or the statement of any reason - a provision 
permitted by federal statute as of the time of her eviction. Sug-
gestively soon before the day she was served with an eviction 
notice, she had been elected chairman of a tenants' association. 
From the face of the pleadings, it is fair to assume that her ac-
tivity in this regard was wholly protected by the first amend-
ment, and that a published standard providing for her automatic 
eviction for exercising her freedom of association would be set 
aside as an unconstitutional condition upon her first amendment 
rights. Manifestly, however, those rights can be effectively de-
stroyed if the agency can oust her without any procedure suitable 
to guard against the likelihood that its decision is in fact based 
upon antagonism to her exercise of first amendment rights. Thus, 
it may be fair to say that the first amendment itself can impose 
a duty of procedural due process upon those otherwise bound 
by its provisions, and can establish a right to procedural due 
process for those whom its provisions are substantively intended 
to protect. On the other hand, as matters currently stand, con-
stitutional claims to procedural due process in the public sector 
are not absolute, and even important private interests can still 
be taken away without an adequate hearing. It is as yet unclear 
whether the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions will import 
a right to procedural due process in all cases or only when the ad-
ministrative decision rests prima facie on some basis violative 
of an explicit collateral right (such as freedom of speech); if the 
45 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (per curiam). In Thorpe itself a change in agency pro-
cedure, under which a hearing would be required, enabled the Court to avoid the 
constitutional issue. 
1454 HARVARD LAW REVIEW (Vol. 8I!I439 
more limited view is adopted, the doctrine itself would be insuffi-
cient to establish procedural safeguards against decisions which 
are wholly unreasonable but do not imperil such explicit rights. 
Moreover, the additional benefits to be gained even from an 
absolute right to procedural due process are limited. Although 
the right to some form of process may be absolute, the extent to 
which particular safeguards are available nonetheless varies 
according to the circumstances. Where the consequence of error 
is relatively insubstantial, protection against the risk of error 
through the use of elaborate quasi-judicial procedures is sub-
ject to a constitutional trade-off with the need for administrative 
and :fiscal economy. A student who stands in peril only of being 
on social probation may understandably be judged with greater 
informality than one in peril of outright expulsion, just as a job 
applicant need not receive the same type of circumspect hearing 
as a long-time employee whose employment alternatives have 
dwindled away and who is faced with the threat of discharge. 
In addition, where substantive statutory standards have been 
met- or where there are no such standards - and there is no 
recognized constitutional infringement, the right to procedural 
due process will not serve to expand substantive rights. Pro-
cedural due process alone would not, for example, protect Mrs. 
Thorpe from eviction for no reason at all where no reason is re-
quired under the governing statute. Yet despite these limitations, 
a right to procedural due process is desirable; a hearing can ex-
pose to public view arbitrary or inequitable grounds for a decision, 
thus facilitating a political remedy even where no legal remedy 
is available, and may serve to establish the channels for an in-
dividual to present his viewpoint to otherwise inaccessible admin-
istrators. 
D. Equal Protection 
The greatest circumvention of the distinction has been achieved 
via the equal protection clause. Under that clause, it seemingly 
makes no difference that the threatened interest is a privilege 
rather than a right. Even a privilege, benefit, opportunity, or 
public advantage may not be granted to some but withheld from 
others where the basis of classification and difference in treat-
ment is arbitrary. As Mr. Justice Clark stated in Wieman v. 
Updegraff, in striking down a state loyalty oath read as contain-
ing no requirement of scienter: 46 
46 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). 
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We need not pause to consider whether an abstract ~:ight to public 
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional pro-
tection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursu-
ant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. 
This reasoning in Wieman seems to summarize the following 
more elaborate equal protection argument. It may well be that 
no one has a right to secure or to maintain public employment. 
In determining whom to admit or whom to continue in public 
employment, however, government may not classify individuals 
as eligible or ineligible where the basis of classification is "arbi-
trary or discriminatory." A regulation which restricts the con-
tinuing eligibility of employees to the class willing to conform 
to an unreasonable rule of conduct ipso facto establishes an 
arbitrary classification. Such a regulation denies equal protec-
tion and is therefore unconstitutional.47 
In the unconstitutional conditions and indirect effects cases, 
as we have observed, the petitioner has been obliged to show in 
what way the regulation adversely affects some interest readily 
recognized as falling within some fairly explicit provision of 
the Bill of Rights, such as his freedom of speech or religion, his 
right to privacy, or his privilege against self-incrimination. But 
since a legislative classification may be arbjtrary on grounds 
other than that it adversely affects any of these particular in-
terests, it is clear that the scope of equal protection is not limiteq 
to regulations infringing only one or more of these traditionally 
recognized rights. And since virtually every regulation of the 
public sector falls short of universality, the equal protection 
clause in this fashion may ultimately enable the petitioner con-
stitutionally to challenge the reasonableness of the rule or condi-
tion affecting his status in the public sector, whether or not the 
rule is unreasonable only in the narrow sense that it menaces a 
"right" protected by an express provision in the Constitution. In 
this respect, a claim of equal protection is freed of the limita-
tions which apply to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
and to the indirect effects cases. 
When viewed in this manner, an equal protection claim may, 
in fact, enable the petitioner effectively to raise .virtually the 
47 Wieman can also perfectly well be analyzed as a case in which the decision 
was based upon an indirect effects or even an unconstitutional conditions approach. 
However, it seems more plausibly to be an equal protection case, especially since 
the Court's choice of words ("arbitrary," "discriminatory") tends to describe an 
invalid scheme of legislative classification. 
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same arguments that he could have raised directly under a 
concept of substantive due process as applied to interests in 
the public sector. A systematic review of the equal protection 
and due process lines of cases would, I believe, readily establish 
that the constitutional tests of "arbitrary classification" are 
rapidly becoming indistinguishable from the constitutional tests 
of "unreasonable regulation" under the due process clause. In-
deed, it is fair to say that the two clauses have almost completely 
merged. When a direct substantive due process claim is raised 
against a general regulation, the Court tends to assign a certain 
value to the private interest which is being pressed and then 
proceeds to require that the regulation be more or less rationally 
connected to an allowable public interest not equally capable of 
accomplishment by alternative means less detrimental to the 
private interest. When an equal protection claim is raised 
against a legislative classification, the Court also tends to assign 
a certain value to the private interest which is being pressed 
and then proceeds to require that the basis of the classification 
be more or less rationally connected to an allowable public 
interest not equally capable of accomplishment by alternative 
means less detrimental to the private interest.48 And the pri-
vate interest may be, as in Wieman, primarily an interest in a 
public job, or, as in Brown v. Board of Education/9 an interest 
in a public education, or, as in Douglas v. California, Go an interest 
in an appeal from a felony conviction- none of which is a 
"right" protected under the due process clause.51 
The potentialities for overthrowing restrictions attached to 
government largess which courts may hold to be "unreasonable" 
through the use of the equal protection clause are only begin-
48 I do not in the least mean to imply that the Supreme Court is reckless or 
unconstrained in its manner of ascertaining and balancing the respective interests. 
Indeed, given the nature of the Constitution, I see no alternative to this kind of 
inquiry so long as judicial review is with us. 
49 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
50 372 u.s. 353 (xg6s). 
51 But cj. note 53 infra (interest in public education held protected by due pro-
cess). It might be argued that a meaningful distinction still exists between claims 
of equal protection and claims of due process, in that the former can be disposed 
of any time government elects wholly to withdraw a particular privilege, while 
the rights upon which substantive due process is based cannot similarly be system-
atically destroyed. However, the likelihood of a state abandoning its system of 
public education or its appellate procedure, or withdrawing from the field of public 
employment is small. So long as the state continues to operate in the public sector, 
claims based on the equal protection clause should continue to avoid the right-
privilege problem. 
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ning to achieve recognition. Yet an approach which treats ar-
bitrary rules or actions in terms of their discriminatory effects 
is capable of greatly extending constitutional safeguards into 
the expanding public sector, as recent decisions striking down 
one-year residency requirements for welfare assistance dem-
onstrate. 52 This use of the equal protection clause, although 
it does not qualify the right-privilege distinction, does succeed 
in rendering it inconsequentiaJ.53 
E. Bills of Attainder 
In the case of American Communications Association v. 
Douds,54 a majority of the Supreme Court upheld a provision 
of the Taft-Hartley Act 55 which denied access to the National 
Labor Relations Board to any labor union whose officers de-
clined to file noncommunist disclaimer affidavits. In that case, 
the Court rejected a claim that this provision constituted a bill 
of attainder in violation of article I, section 9 of the Constitu-
tion.56 In 1965, however, the Court in United States v. Brown 57 
adopted the argument in invalidating a successor provision of 
the statute; 58 the disabling of a certain fixed group from serving 
as officers in a union constituted a sufficient "penalty" to be 
noticeable under the attainder clause. Although this is not the 
place to analyze Brown or the full requirements of a claim of 
attainder, it should be sufficient to note that this argument, in 
~2 E.g., Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967); Green v. De-
partment of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967). 
~3 One theoretical limitation on the effectiveness of an equal protection argu-
ment is the absence of an equal protection clause in the fifth amendment to be 
applied to the federal government. However, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
(1954), the companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, the Court read an 
equal protection provision into the due process clause. Although it was specifically 
stated that the two were not necessarily interchangeable, the Court's later argu-
ment that it would not read the Constitution to impose a lesser duty upon the 
federal government than upon the states should be equally applicable to the type 
of situation discussed in this article. 
54 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
55 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) ch. 120, § 9(h), 6x 
Stat. 146 (1947) (repealed 1959). 
56 339 U.S. at 412-14; see id. at 449-51 (Black, J., dissenting). 
57 381 U.S. 437 (1965), noted in The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. 
REv. 56, 120 (1965); cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
58 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 504, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 504 (1964). Although § 504 differs in various ways from the statute up-
held in Douds, the Court's reasoning in Brown indicates that the earlier case is 
effectively overruled. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 457-58 (1965); 
id. at 464-65 (White, J., dissenting). 
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the narrow class of cases to which .it may be applied, renders 
the right-privilege distinction inconsequential to the extent that 
the attainder clause protects "privileges," such as access to 
the NLRB or the privilege of serving as a union officer, as readily 
as it protects "rights." 
· Given these several means of limiting or avoiding entirely 
the effects of Holmes' ruling in McAuliffe, we may well conclude 
that the right-privilege distinction has lost most of its significance 
in constitutional litigation. Under these circumstances, we might 
also conclude that the .cutting edge of the right-privilege distinc-
tion has been ground down to such an extent that no harm is done 
by leaving its essential logic unexamined. A respect for the great-
ness.of Mr. Justice Holmes suggests, moreover, that to tilt at his 
epigram even after it has ceased to do much mischief is a task 
likely to degrade the critic far more than to diminish the stature of 
a great Justice. There is, however, an unfinished feel about these 
several devices which circumvent the right-privilege distinction, 
and a humiliating concession common to them all. The implicit 
concession is that Holmes was correct in his basic position, and 
that we have managed merely to evade his statement without 
daring to meet it head on with a convincing intellectual response. 
This failure to meet Holmes on his own ground means, moreover, 
that constitutional decision making in the field of governmental 
relations still follows no predictable course. With this in mind, 
we turn back one last time to the epigram itself. 
III. AN EPIGRAM UNDONE 
Mr. Justice Holmes was surely the Supreme Court's master of 
epigrams, 59 but he was quick to recognize the spurious seductive-
ness of the well-turned phrase- even when it was his own. As 
a general admonition he once remarked: 60 
It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted 
in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further 
analysis. 
Fortunately Holmes did provide a further analysis of his own 
encysted phrase of 1892, that "[t]he petitioner may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional 
• 
59 For a bibliography and collection, see E. BANDER, JusTICE HoLMES, Ex 
CATHEDRA (Ig66). 
60 Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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right to be a policeman." The analysis was provided in a brief 
article in r9r8 in which Holmes developed a concept he had 
passingly mentioned in The Common Law.61 Addressing himself 
to the nature of a legal right, Holmes suggested: 62 
[F] or legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy-
the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public 
force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to con-
travene it- just as we talk of the force of gravitation accounting 
for the conduct of bodies in space. One phrase adds no more than 
the other to what we know without it. 
Thus Holmes himself readily admitted that to deny that a person 
had a "right" to something was merely to announce the conclusion 
that a court would not give him any relief; but the denia."I itself 
provides no reason whatever why such relief should be denied.63 
The impact of the McAuliffe epigram on succeeding generations 
of courts has been a dual one. As used by Holmes it represents 
the inference that because public employment is not protected, 
retention of that privilege may be conditioned on the giving up 
of first amendment rights. This non sequitur has been eiposed 
and rejected by the courts applying the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine.64 The more invidious impact of the epigram, 
however, has been its use to supply a reason why public status 
is not protected in the first place- because such status is a 
61 O.W. HoLMES, JR., Tm; COMMON LAw 169 (M. Howe ed. 1963). 
62 Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HAR.v. L. REv. 40, 42 (1918) (emphasis added); 
see 2 HoLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 212-74 (M. Howe ed. 1941). 
Holmes' likening of "right" to "gravity" is doubtless traceable in part to Ute 
influence of William James and Ute very skeptical writings of David Hume, who 
bad used Ute "gravity" example in precisely Ute same fashion 170 years earlier. 
See D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CoNCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 26-28 (Gate-
way 1956). Unlike Hume, whose skepticism led him to become a confirmed 
Tory, however, Holmes was led by his own rejection of absolutes generally to em-
brace Ute democratic process as Ute least dangerous means of establishing short-
term political trutlts. 
63 Holmes was among the first of Ute legal realists to deflate Ute use of "right" 
from a reason in support of a court's decision to a mere tipoff or reiteration of 
the result. See O.W. HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAw 169 (M. Howe ed. 1963). 
See also Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 MICH. L. REV. I, 
7-8, 15-16 (1913); Hobfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
64 The collateral effect on freedom of speech may not have counted for much 
to Holmes in 1892 simply because constitutional doctrine in that area was not to 
, develop for another 20 years. Holmes himself radically altered his views re-
specting free speech between 1892 and 1920. Compare Commonwealth v. Davis, 
162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. II3 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), with Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 6r6, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) __ 
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privilege rather than a right. But, as Holmes' own analysis 
shows, the epigram on this point plainly yields no reason at all. 
If we take it as stating a reason, contrary to Holmes' intention, 
it becomes a perfectly circular argument. This can be seen by 
substituting Holmes' definition of "right" for the word itself as 
used in the epigram. Attempting to use the right-privilege dis-
tinction as a reason to deny relief to McAuliffe then produces 
only the following tautology: 
Because the public force wiii not be brought to bear upon those 
who discharged petitioner, he has no right to be a policeman. And 
because petitioner therefore has no right to be a policeman, the 
public force wiii not be brought to bear upon those who discharged 
him. 
Thus restated, the epigram scarcely presents itself as an adequate 
basis for extinguishing constitutional review. It plainly does not 
say why petitioner's dismissal was constitutionally tolerable under 
the circumstances of the case, nor will continued staring at the 
epigram ever so enlighten us. 
A further examination of Holmes' statement in McAuliffe and 
of the government's position today, moreover, will indicate that 
the conclusion in McAuliffe is unsound and undesirable. In re-
jecting McAuliffe's claim to constitutional protection of his em-
ployment status with the government, Holmes appears to declare 
that an individual's employment interest in the public sector 
stands on no higher constitutional footing than individual em-
ployment interests in the private sector.6G The point emerges 
for a second time in Commonwealth v. Davis: 66 
For the Legislature absolutely or conditionaily to forbid public 
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement 
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a 
private house to forbid it in his house. 
If Holmes' reasoning was that infringements in the public sec-
tor which are no greater than nor different from infringements 
in the private sector can be no more subject to constitutional 
restraint than are the private infringements, his point, no matter 
how plausible it seems when read quickly, is a non sequitur. To 
be sure, the fourteenth amendment leaves private infringements 
unaffected, and it does so whether such infringements are great or 
small, reasonable or arbitrary. That, after all, was the lesson of 
65 See p. 1439 supra. 
66 162 Mass. 510, su, 39 N.E. II3, 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
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the Civil Rights Cases 61 in their literal rendering of the amend-
ment: that it is only a "state" which is forbidden to ignore due 
process and equal protection in its dealings with individuals. 
Far from providing that states are under no greater obligation 
to observe due process in the conduct of their enterprises than 
are private employers or home owners in the management of 
similar enterprises, however, the amendment expressly distin-
guishes the two situations for constitutional purposes and pro-
vides that it is specifically the state (if only the state) which 
must observe due process. And the amendment does not say 
that "no State, except when acting in a proprietary capacity," shall 
deny due process; rather, it makes no distinction at all respecting 
the capacity in which the state acts. 
Even if the text of the fourteenth amendment were less clear 
and even if there were room for a distinction to be made between 
"proprietary" and "governmental" state action there would be 
no reason to make it. As a wholly original proposition, it is dif-
ficult to see any need to vouchsafe to government the prerogative 
of arbitrary power or of fundamental unfairness in its conduct 
of a public undertaking. A minimum demand of uniformly rea-
sonable rules in the management of public largess is surely an 
unexceptionable requirement of constitutional government. In-
deed, the fact that arbitrary decision making in the private sector 
is not subject to constitutional restraint makes it even more im-
portant to provide individuals with an alternative sphere of 
activity by foreclosing such power in the public sector.68 
With the increasing size of government as an economic unit, 
moreover, it is simply no longer true that a particular infringe-
ment related to employment by government is no greater than 
a particular infringement made by a private employer. Holmes' 
conclusion that there is "no constitutional right to be a policeman" 
may have been influenced by the comparatively small economic 
role played by governmental units in r892. Excluding McAuliffe 
from public employment still left open to him a very large per-
centage of the available employment in the country. But today 
the federal and state governments directly or indirectly control 
a great proportion of the nation's employment; if one is unable 
67 I09 U.S. 3 (I883). 
68 This is not to imply that government may not act in ·the interests of effi-
ciency, economy, or a "maximizing of profits"; quite the contrary. But if the gov-
ernment is to act in a fashion detrimental to any citizen, whether government em-
ployee, government contractor, or welfare recipient, it should have. a rational 
purpose for its action which relates to the function which it is performing. 
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to hold public employment, his chances of personal economic 
success are significantly limited. Not only is he excluded from 
a substantial portion of the available jobs, ranging from post-
man to nuclear scientist, but his bargaining power with other 
employers is proportionately decreased. And the expansion of 
government with its attendant influence on the individual is not 
limited to employment, for the government is playing an increas-
ingly crucial role in other areas such as housing, education, and 
welfare. In the field of welfare especially, the individual's alter-
natives to acceptance of arbitrary government action are prac-
tically nonexistent, and the potential control over his personal 
life is therefore practically absolute. This substantial influence 
which expanded governmental activity gives the government 
over the private lives of its citizenry makes the restraints of 
substantive due process necessary. Indeed, a failure to demand 
substantive due process of government even as it expands would 
be a constitutional incongruity against the emerging trend to 
bring private decision makers within the Constitution when the 
impact of their enterprises becomes so great that the power they 
wield is functionally equivalent to that traditionally exercised 
only by government.69 
If, under a functional analysis, the conclusion reached by 
Justice Holmes in 1892 is no longer viable, then Holmes' own 
methodology should be used to label an individual's interest in 
his public status a "right" directly protected against unreasonable 
regulation; Such unreasonableness need involve only the lack 
of a sufficient connection with an adequately compelling public 
interest to warrant subordinating the individual interest under 
the circumstances. The protection of an employee's job interest, 
a student's interest in public education, or a tenant's interest in 
public housing would thus not depend upon the fortuitous in-
volvement of still other protected rights. These other rights 
might enhance the individual's claim and they might make it 
even clearer that the regulation in question is constitutionally 
unreasonable, but they would not be indispensable to the peti-
tioner's success. 
The application of the view that substantive due process applies 
directly to status interests in the public sector, has been confirmed 
69 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. sox (1946); cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 
296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 481-84 (1953) (separate opinion of 
Clark:, J.). See generally Berle, Legal Problems of Economic Power, 6o CoLUM, 
L. REv. 4, 4-6, g-xo (1966). 
rg68] RIGHT-PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION 
in some recent judicial action~ In 1961, for example, the 'Fifth 
Circuit laid aside the right-privilege tradition in protecting the 
interest of a student in completing his college education at a 
public university.70 Its decision was followed in a case involving 
school suspensions, in which a district court commented: 71 
Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a privilege, 
the fact remains that it is an interest of almost incalculable value, 
, especially to those students who have already 'enrolled in the in-
stitution and begun the pursuit of their college training. Private 
interests are to be evaluated under the due process clause. of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not in terms of labels or fictions, but in 
terms of their true significance and worth. 
And the Supreme Court appeared to agree when it ordered New 
York to reinstate a professor at Brooklyn College who had been 
discharged because of his refusal to testify before the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee.72 
We may be a long time in working out the content of substantive 
due process in the public sector, just as we have been a long 
time evolving its standards in the private sector. Overzealous 
courts may err too far in the protection of this "new property," 
and then shift violently to the other extreme, just as they once 
overextended themselves in behalf of the old property, only ulti-
mately to leave it to the mercies of the political process.73 But 
that under appropriate circumstances one's interest in his gov-
ernment job, his publicly financed home, his food stamp meals, 
or his state university educational opportunities may indeed be 
70 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 930 (Ig6I). 
71 Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). 
72 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956): 
To state that a person does not have a constitutional right to government em-
ployment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and 
nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities. 
C/. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (social security benefits). See also 
Bagley v. Washington Twp. Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 401 (1966)·; Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Dist. 
Ct. App. I967). 
73 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Hetherington, 
State Economic Regulatiott and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. UL. 
REv. 13 (1958); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: 
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 34; Reich, The New Property, 
73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). The phrase, "new property," belongs to Professor 
Reich. It is already too well established to be displaced, but I mildly regret its 
use; it may imply that the Court should be only as diligent in protecting status 
in the public sector as in protecting the old property from state regulation-
which would result, of course, in scarcely any protection at all. 
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constitutional rights in the positive-law sense ought no longer 
be denied. That these interests may be regulated compatibly with 
other competing interests need not be denied either, any more 
than it can be denied that interests in private property may be 
regulated by zoning ordinances, sanitation codes, building per-
mits, or antidiscrimination laws. Any per se constitutional dis-
tinction which would exclude governmental regulation of status 
in the public sector from constitutional review would, to steal a 
phrase from Mr. Justice Holmes, reflect neither logic nor experi-
ence in the law. 
